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Abstract
Jan  Lukasiewicz’s treatise on Aristotle’s Syllogistic, published in the
1950s, has been very influential in framing contemporary understand-
ing of Aristotle’s logical systems. However,  Lukasiewicz’s interpreta-
tion is based on a number of tendentious claims, not least, the claim
that the syllogistic was intended to apply only to non-empty terms. I
show that this interpretation is not true to Aristotle’s text and that
a more coherent and faithful interpretation admits empty terms while
maintaining all the relations of the traditional square of opposition.
There is a widespread account of Aristotle’s logic which claims that it
applies only to non-empty terms. We find it recently endorsed in, e.g., the
Stanford Encyclopedia article on ‘Aristotle’s Logic’:
“[According to Aristotle] we can get ‘Some monsters are chimeras’
from the apparently true ‘All chimeras are monsters’; but the
former is often construed as implying in turn ‘There is some-
thing which is a monster and a chimera’, and thus that there are
monsters and there are chimeras. In fact, this simply points up
something about Aristotle’s system: Aristotle in effect supposes
that all terms in syllogisms are non-empty.” (Smith, 2009)
According to Church (1965, 420), this account stems from  Lukasiewicz, who
wrote in 1929:
“In Aristotle’s logic, empty names may not be the values of . . .
name variables.” ( Lukasiewicz, 1963, 103)1
∗This work was initially supported by Research Grant AH/F018398/1 (Foundations of
Logical Consequence) from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, UK.
1Italics in the original. He repeated the claim in his definitive work of 1951: “Aristotle
does not introduce into his logic singular or empty terms or quantifiers. He applies his
logic only to universal terms, like ‘man’ or ‘animal’ . . . Singular, empty, and also negative
terms are excluded as values.” ( Lukasiewicz, 1957, 130, 72)
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In fact, the claim goes back at least as far as S´leszyn´ski (1921). According
to W ladis law Bednarowski (1956, 227), “S´leszyn´ski assumes that the terms
employed in the Aristotelian logic are not empty,” and in Bednarowski (1949,
543, 545), he noted that S´leszyn´ski’s reason was a general belief that the laws
of the syllogism and of the square of opposition are otherwise invalidated.2
The doctrine was taken up by the Kneales in their influential history:
“In order to justify Aristotle’s doctrine as a whole it is neces-
sary, then, to suppose that he assumed application for all general
terms with which he dealt,” (Kneale and Kneale, 1962, 62)
and by Patzig in his influential study:
“[Aristotle] assumes without further argument that . . . in each
case [the set of subject (predicate, contrary) terms] have at least
one member.” (Patzig, 1968, 6-7)3
John Martin (2004, 6, 20) and Seuren (2010, 158 ff.) claim in addition
that, whereas Aristotle restricted terms in syllogisms to non-empty species
terms, it was the medievals who widened the scope of syllogistic to allow
empty terms. But against this weight of authority there have been several
lone voices: Manley Thompson in 1953, Michael Wedin in 1996, Terry Par-
sons in his Stanford Encyclopedia article on the Square of Opposition, and
Gisela Striker in her recent translation of the Prior Analytics.4 They claim
that Aristotle himself intended his syllogistic to apply to empty as well as
non-empty terms. We need to go back to Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (on
the nature of syllogistic propositions) and Prior Analytics (on the nature of
inference) and look closely at what he actually says there.
In De Interpretatione chs. 7-8, Aristotle distinguishes between four dif-
ferent types of subject-predicate propositions:
2I owe the reference to S´leszyn´ski to Professor Wojciech Suchon´ of the Jagiellonian
University in Cracow. S´leszyn´ski’s book was reviewed in  Lukasiewicz (1923). S´leszyn´ski
may have been the first to attribute to Aristotle the exclusion of empty terms from his
syllogistic, but he was not the first to query the validity of the Square in the presence of
empty terms. See Wu (1969) and Keynes (1884, §§104-6).
3We also find it in Corcoran (1974, 104): “Since Aristotle held that every secondary
substance must subsume at least one primary substance, . . . j is an interpretation of L
if and only if j is a function which assigns a non-empty set to each member of U ,” and
Smiley (1973, 143): “The intended interpretation . . . is the familiar one in which the
terms are understood as ranging over non-null classes.”
4Thompson (1953), Wedin (1996), Parsons (2008b), Aristotle (2009, 88).
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Affirmative Negative
Singular Socrates is white Socrates is not white
Indeterminate Men are white Men are not white
Particular Some man is white Some man is not white
Not every man is white
Universal Every man is white No man is white
Some have claimed that Aristotle does not include singular propositions
among the syllogistic. But this is not true: Aristotle gives several examples
of syllogistic reasoning containing singular propositions, e.g.,
Every ambitious man is generous
Pittacus is ambitious
So Pittacus is generous. (Ross, 1928, 70a27)5
One argument, much repeated,6 is that Aristotle cannot include singular
terms in syllogistic propositions because it is essential that terms in them
can take both subject and predicate position, and Aristotle explicitly rules
out the occurrence of singular terms in predicate position. (See 43a25 ff.)
But the middle term in the third figure only occurs as subject, so certainly
singular terms could always occur in third figure syllogisms, in addition to
cases such as the (first-figure) syllogism about Pittacus above. In fact, unless
it is circular, ecthesis (that is, the expository syllogism) involves singular
propositions essentially. In general, Aristotle treats singular propositions
like universal ones.7
Indeterminate propositions are ambiguous: contrast ‘Men are animals’
(interpreted as a universal) with ‘Men are running down the street’ (usually
interpreted as particular).  Lukasiewicz (1957, 5) claims that Aristotle takes
indeterminate propositions to be particular, for Aristotle follows his demon-
stration of the validity of Darii, which has a particular as minor premise,
with the comment (see also 29a28-29):
“The same holds if the premiss BC should be indeterminate
and positive [i.e., affirmative], for the same syllogism will result
5See also 47b23 ff., where we have the invalid syllogistic form: Aristomenes as an object
of thought always exists, Aristomenes is Aristomenes as an object of thought, but it does
not follow that Aristomenes always exists; and 47b30, for similarly invalid reasoning, where
Aristotle remarks that it is true to predicate ‘educated Miccalus’ of Miccalus. At II 24,
69a1, war against Thebes is given as an instance of war against neighbours.
6See, e.g.,  Lukasiewicz (1957, §3), Bochenski (1962, 13 C 5, 70) and Kneale and Kneale
(1962, 67). Cf. Striker in Aristotle (2009, 76).
7See, e.g., 70a16-21, where Aristotle proves that the wise are good by Darapti from the
fact that Pittacus was wise and good.
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whether we take it to be indeterminate or particular.” (26a29-
30)
However, he may equally well mean that whether we take the indeterminate
premise to be universal or particular, the syllogistic conclusion will follow,
either by Barbara or by Darii.8
But on the whole, Aristotle takes syllogistic propositions to be universal
or particular, affirmative and negative. The Square of Opposition is an
attempt to formalize what Aristotle describes in De Interpretatione 7:9
A-form: Every S is P
I-form: Some S is P O-form: Not every S is P
E-form: No S is P
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Each universal proposition entails its subalternates. Contraries cannot both
be true. Subcontraries cannot be false together. Contradictories cannot
both be true and cannot both be false.
Strawson, claiming that Aristotle’s logic is restricted to non-empty terms,
suggests that each constituent proposition presupposes the non-emptiness of
the subject, failing which it has no truth-value:
“If we interpret the propositions of the [square] as neither pos-
itively, nor negatively, nor positively and negatively, existential,
but as sentences such that the question of whether they are being
used to make true or false assertions does not arise except when
the existential condition is fulfilled for the subject term, then all
the traditional laws hold good together.” (Strawson, 1950, 343-
4—italics in original)
Geach had expressed a similar view in the previous issue of Mind:
8I owe this observation to Russell Jones.
9In fact, the earliest known reference to the square is in Apuleius of Madaura (2nd
century CE). See Londey and Johanson (1987, Appendix 2, 108-12). Apuleius does not
mention subalternation in reference to the square.
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“If ‘S’ is a pseudo-name like ‘dragon’ or ‘round square’, and
names nothing, none of the [four Aristotelian] forms has a truth-
value, and so the ‘square of opposition’ becomes not invalid but
inapplicable.” (Geach, 1950, 480)
 Lukasiewicz (1957, 4), as we noted, claims that “in building his logic Aristo-
tle did not take notice either of singular or of empty terms.” But Aristotle
is happy to speak of the “goat-stag” as an object of knowledge qua not ex-
isting (49a24) and to ask if there is a centaur or a God (89b32). Complex
terms, which can be empty, e.g., ‘sleeping horses’ (40a38) are included in the
syllogistic. That Aristotle rejects uninstantiated universals does not mean
he didn’t think there were any empty terms. The Kneales answer their own
question, “Are we then to say that Aristotle’s teaching is inconsistent . . . ?”
(Kneale and Kneale, 1962, 58-9) by claiming that unless non-empty terms
are excluded altogether, there is no consistent interpretation at all which
preserves all the relations of the Square.
This despairing conclusion is not warranted. The heart of the issue is
the interpretation of O- and A-propositions. For Aristotle, O-propositions
do not have existential import, while A-propositions do. Once this is re-
alised, we find a consistent and straightforward reading of Aristotle’s view,
one which does not restrict the syllogistic to non-empty terms. This reading
was recognised by the medieval commentators, and by Moody, Prior and
Parsons, among others:10
∀x(Sx ⊃ Px) ∧ ∃xSx
∃x(Sx ∧ Px) ∃x(Sx ∧ ¬Px) ∨ ¬∃xSx
¬∃x(Sx ∧ Px)
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It was not just moderni like Ockham and Buridan who attributed existential
import to universal affirmative. In his inteview with Wilfrid Hodges (2011,
182), Niki Pfeifer asks: “Mentioning Aristotle’s syllogisms, is Ibn Sina mak-
ing existential import assumptions? I.e., does ‘Every A is a B’ presuppose
10See, e.g., Burley (2000, 110), Ockham (1974, II 3), Buridan (2001, I 5), Moody (1953,
52), Prior (1962, 169) and Parsons (2008a,b).
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that A is non-empty?”, to which Hodges replies:
“Yes. When there are no As, he takes affirmative sentences with
subject A (for example ‘Every A is a B’) as false, and negative
statements with subject A (for example ‘It’s not the case that
every A is a B’) as true. I don’t think we know where this
convention came from, but it’s certainly older than Ibn Sina.”11
My claim is that this interpretation goes right back to Aristotle. In fact,
Aristotle commonly (though not invariably) expresses the O-proposition as
‘Not every S is P ’ (or as he usually puts it: ‘P does not belong to every S’),
and he clearly treats ‘P does not belong to every S’ as equivalent to ‘P does
not belong to some S’. He says of the O-proposition (see also 27b20-21):
“Further, since [P ]’s not belonging to some [S] is indeterminate—
it is true that it does not belong to some both if it belongs to
none and if it does not belong to all.” (26b15)
By ‘indeterminate’, he means that there are two possible causes of its truth.
Thus ‘P does not belong to some S’ (i.e., ‘Some S is not P ’) is not equiva-
lent to ‘Not-P belongs to some S’ (i.e., ‘Some S is not-P ’). Aristotle rejects
obversion: ‘Some S is not-P ’ is affirmative, and entails the negative propo-
sition ‘Some S is not P ’, but is not entailed by it. Moreover, ‘No S is P ’
is the contradictory of ‘Some S is P ’. ‘Some S is P ’ entails there is an S.
So ‘No S is P ’ does not entail there is an S.12 Indeed, Aristotle spends
the whole of Prior Analytics I 46 arguing that ‘is not P ’ and ‘is not-P ’ are
different. He writes:
“It makes a difference in establishing or refuting whether one
believes that ‘not to be this’ and ‘to be not-this’ signify the
same or different things. For example, ‘not to be white’ and ‘to
be not-white’:13 for these do not signify the same, nor is ‘to be
not-white’ the denial of ‘to be white’; rather, it is ‘not to be
white’,” (51b6-9)
11See also Hodges (2012), where an English translation of the relevant passage (Al-
Shifa’: Al-Ibara 79.11 to 81.4) is given on pp. 132-3. See also Avicenna (2013). Hodges’
answer shows that ‘Every A is B’ does not presuppose that there are As (as in Strawson’s
interpretation, and as Pfeiffer’s question suggests) but entails it.
12Else the existence of S would be necessary.
13Correcting Striker’s translation, where ‘not’ is omitted from ‘not to be white’.
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and spends several pages explaining the difference. Consequently, the O-
proposition ‘Not every S is P ’ (or ‘Some S is not P ’) does not entail that
there is an S.14
Accordingly, A-propositions, as the contradictories of O-propositions,
require the existence of their subject. But the existential import of A-
propositions seems to entail that no such propositions concerning corrupt-
ible things can be necessary, that is, always true. Ockham (1974, III-2 c. 5,
512)15 observes that this is contrary to Aristotle’s doctrine, when he claims,
for example (Prior Analytics I 15, 34b17), that man is an animal of ne-
cessity. Does the fact that Aristotle thought that such propositions were
demonstrably true show that he did not accord existential import to them?
Not at all. Knowledge of such necessities, which ground all scientific knowl-
edge, derives for Aristotle from knowledge of essence presented in intuition,
that is, perception. Accordingly, as he says repeatedly in the Posterior An-
alytics (e.g., 92b5; cf. 93a19): “no one knows the nature of what does not
exist.” (Ross, 1928) Thus knowledge of essence guarantees existence, and
so for Aristotle, unlike Ockham, there is no warrant for scepticism about
scientific knowledge. Buridan (2014, 141) makes the same point, adding
that “Aristotle believed such [propositions as ‘A horse is an animal’] to be
simply necessary because he thought that the eternity of the world and uni-
versal nature could not allow that at some time nothing was a horse or a
dog.” The important point to realise is that what Ockham means is not that
the existential import of affirmatives is contrary to Aristotle’s doctrine, but
rather the belief that in consequence such propositions cannot be necessary.
Seuren (2010, 125) claims that the reading attributing existential im-
port to affirmatives and not to negatives “violates natural intuitions: some
F is not-G clearly implies intuitively that not all F is G,”16 and that
“the modern notion of internal negation . . . was not available to Aristotle.”
(Seuren, 2010, 59) This surprising claim seems to overlook Aristotle’s careful
discussion in Prior Analytics I 46. His account there was the hard-won result
of a succession of treatments of negation in the Metaphysics, the Topics, De
14Nicholas Rescher comments in his translation of Al-Farabi’s commentary on the Prior
Analytics (Rescher, 1963, 61 fn. 9) (and again at fns. 22a, 31, 41, 44 in the same section)
that although he translates the Arabic as ‘Some X is not E’: “Literally, that Not every
X is E. Al-Farabi frequently formulates O-propositions in this way.” We can be grateful
that he points this out; but he should have translated it more closely to begin with, else
we have interpretation rather than translation.
15English translation at Ockham (2007, 159).
16Actually, there is a non-sequitur in Seuren’s reasoning here. That ‘Some F is not-G’
implies there is an F (which is true) does not prevent it entailing propositions (e.g., ‘Not
all F is G’) which do not.
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Interpretatione and Prior Analytics (Bochenski, 1962, §12), distinguishing
the various propositions which are in different senses ‘opposite’ to a given
proposition. Thus, e.g., ‘No S is P ’ is opposite to ‘Every S is P ’ as its
contrary, ‘Not every S is P ’ is opposite as its contradictory, and ‘Some S
is P ’ is opposite as its subaltern.17 These are represented in the Square of
Opposition. But Prior Analytics I 46 shows that there is a further opposite,
‘Every S is not-P ’. Thus among the many contraries of ‘Every S is P ’ there
is both a negative contrary, ‘No S is P ’, and an affirmative contrary, ‘Every
S is not-P ’; accordingly, there are two internal negations, one negating the
copula and producing the negative contrary, the other negating the predi-
cate and resulting in the affirmative contrary. This affirmative contrary has
its own opposites, ‘No S is not-P ’, ‘Not every S is not-P ’ and ‘Some S is
not-P ’, as well as ‘Every S is P ’. Together, they form a cube, with two
squares on parallel faces, one for the propositions with positive predicates
(A,E,I,O), the other for the negated predicates (A*, ¬I* = E*, I*, ¬A* =
O*, * marking predicate negation):18
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A: Every S is P
E: No S is P
I: Some S is P
O: Not every S is P
A*: Every S is not-P
E*: No S is not-P
I*: Some S is not-P
O*: Not every S is not-P
The face containing A, A*, I and I* consists of the affirmatives, that con-
taining E, E*, O and O* the negatives. The top face (A, A*, E, E*) contains
the universals, the bottom face (I, I*, O, O*) the particular propositions.
Each universal node has an affirmative and a negative contrary connected to
it, each particular an affirmative and a negative sub-contrary. Moreover, A*
17See, e.g., Keynes (1884, §53).
18These eight nodes also appear in Seuren (2010, Fig. 3.7(c), 97), but as the nodes of
an octagon. He calls it the “Aristotelian-Abelardian Predicate Calculus”.
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implies E, A implies E*, I implies O* and I* implies O, and each universal
node implies the particular node beneath it (as its subaltern).
Seuren’s mistake, we now see, is to equate ‘Some S is not-P ’ with ‘Some
S is not P ’. The former is an affirmative proposition, false if there is no
S, whereas the latter is a negative proposition, true in those circumstances.
Aristotle wrote in Prior Analytics I 46:
“It is clear that ‘is not-white’ and ‘is not white’ signify different
things and that one is an affirmation, the other a denial.” (52a24-
26)
Nonetheless, Seuren is partly right: Aristotle’s system would be “nonvalid”
(Seuren, 2010, 14), that is, useless as a logical system, if it applied only to
non-empty terms, for there is no logical guarantee that a term is non-empty.
Aristotle was too good a logician to miss that. For Aristotle, existence
goes with quality, not quantity. The I-proposition ‘Some S is P ’ is false if
there is no S (e.g., goat-stag, centaur, white raven, sleeping horse). So its
contradictory, the E-proposition ‘No S is P ’ is true if there is no S. Thus
its subaltern, the O-proposition ‘Not every S is P ’ is also true, whence its
contradictory, the A-proposition ‘Every S is P ’, which Aristotle believes
implies the I-proposition, must be false if there is no S. Contrast:
‘Every 3-year old student is doing a Ph.D.’—arguably false, with
‘Every winged horse has wings’—arguably true
Aristotle takes them to be uniformly false if the subject-term is empty. So
‘Every S is S’ is false if there is no S. Indeed, on Aristotle’s principles, ‘All
chimeras are monsters’ is false, as is ‘All chimeras are chimeras’. There is
only one passage where Aristotle commits himself to the self-predication:
“B is affirmed . . . of itself” (68a19). However, in this case its truth follows
from the given assumption that A belongs to every B, so the argument begs
the question: unless the A-proposition can be true when B is empty, B is
true of itself only on the assumption that B is non-empty. Aristotle does
not claim that ‘Every B is B’ is always true.
Given that the A-proposition ‘Every S is P ’ is false if there is no S,
the corresponding O-proposition must be true either if there is no S or if
there is an S which isn’t P , as we noted Aristotle explicitly says at 26b15.
The negative proposition ‘Not every S is P ’ (or ‘Some S is not P ’) is not
equivalent to the “infinite” and affirmative proposition ‘Some S is not-P ’,
as Aristotle emphasises at Prior Analytics I 46, though it is entailed by it.
There is, however, one passage where Aristotle appears to say that self-
denial (that is, ‘No S is S’ and ‘Some S is not S’) always results in falsehood,
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namely, at Prior Analytics II 15. This is the chapter which  Lukasiewicz
(1957, 9) cites in support of his interpretation, and Thom (1981, 92) and
others follow him. In this chapter, Aristotle considers whether a syllogism
is possible where the premises are opposites—either contraries or contradic-
tories. He observes that the premises are opposites only if one is affirmative
and the other negative, and only if the premises share not only the middle
term but also the other term, asserting and denying the same thing of the
same thing. He then claims that, whereas one can deduce a true conclusion
from falsehoods, one cannot deduce a true conclusion from opposites: “for
the syllogism always comes about contrary to the facts” (64b9-10: gignetai
to pragmati).
However, this does not show that self-denial is always false. For the
subject of the conclusion must appear in both premises, including the affir-
mative premise, so again the argument begs the question. Of course, that
premise may be false—at least one of the premises must be, since they are
opposites. Nonetheless, both terms are assumed to be non-empty in the
affirmative premise. Unless an affirmative proposition about S can be true
when there is no S, which is exactly the issue before us, the conclusion deny-
ing that S is S is false only on the assumption that there is an S. That is
quite correct on the interpretation proposed here: ‘S is not S’ is true if and
only if S does not exist.
Finally, what of Aristotle’s remark at the end of Prior Analytics I 1
that “we speak of ‘being predicated of all’ when nothing can be found of
the subject of which the other will not be said”? Will this not hold when
the subject-term is empty and nothing can be found of the subject at all?
Aristotle commits himself in the very next paragraph, at the beginning of
chapter 2 to the division of propositions exclusively into affirmative and
negative. But some propositions which appear negative are equivalent to
others that appear affirmative. Are they affirmative or negative? Just as
‘No S is P ’ denies what ‘Some S is P ’ says, so too ‘No S is not P ’ denies
what ‘Some S is not P ’, that is, ‘Not every S is P ’, says. So ‘No S is not
P ’ is in fact an affirmation, equivalent to ‘Every S is P ’, as the dictum de
omni says.
I conclude that  Lukasiewicz’s interpretation is mistaken. The weight of
evidence is that Aristotle interpreted affirmative universal propositions the
same way he interpreted singular ones, as false when their subject-terms are
empty:
“With an affirmation and negation one will always be false and
the other true whether [Socrates] exists or not. For take ‘Socrates
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is sick’ and ‘Socrates is not sick’: if he exists it is clear that one
or the other of them will be true or false, and equally if he does
not; for if he does not exist ‘he is sick’ is false but ‘he is not sick’
true.” (De Interpretatione 13b26-31)
On this interpretation, all the relations which Aristotle accepts are pre-
served:
• A- and E-propositions are contrary (cannot both be true) and I- and
O-propositions are subcontrary (cannot both be false)
• A- and O-propositions are contradictories, as are I- and E-propositions
• A-propositions imply their subaltern I-proposition, and E-propositions
their subaltern O-proposition
• I- and E-propositions convert simply (‘Some S is P ’ implies ‘Some P
is S’, and ‘No S is P ’ implies ‘No P is S’)
• A-propositions convert accidentally (‘Every S is P ’ implies ‘Some P
is S’) and O-propositions don’t convert at all
In conclusion, Aristotle takes syllogistic propositions to be singular, in-
determinate, particular or universal. He places no requirement that the
terms be non-empty.  Lukasiewicz was simply mistaken to claim that he did.
Existential commitment goes with quality, not quantity, thus satisfying all
the demands of the Square of Opposition. O-propositions can be expressed
either as ‘P does not belong to every S’ or as ‘P does not belong to some
S’, and are true if there is no S, the corresponding A-proposition then being
false.
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